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3The Difference in Being Poor in Red
States versus Blue States
Michele Gilman
Pundits tell us that our nation is divided between red and blue states, generally
defined by their citizens’ support for Republican or Democratic presidential candi-
dates. In the popular imagination, red states are inhabited by pick-up truck driving,
church-going, beer-swilling, country music lovers who are politically conservative.
By contrast, in blue states, people drive electric cars, sip wine and eat arugula, listen
to NPR, and are bleeding heart, godless liberals. Although these dueling stereotypes
assume that blue state residents are more affluent, neither considers the lives of low-
income people. Nevertheless, a person’s experience at the bottom of the economic
ladder differs widely depending on where they live, and red state versus blue state
policy differences are driving part of that geographic divergence.
These disparities in poverty support have nothing to do with one’s beverage or
music preferences. Instead, red states generally have more punitive public benefits
policies than blue states. This division is likely to widen in coming years as
Republican politicians at the federal and state levels increasingly attach “behavior
modification” requirements to governmental assistance, using federalism tools such
as waivers to do so. For instance, in January 2018, the Trump administration
approved the first waivers to states that want to impose work requirements on
Medicaid recipients. In the first wave of applications, 10 states applied for waivers;
all have Republican governors; eight are Republican controlled in both the execu-
tive and legislative branches. A majority of these states are also among the stingiest
when it comes to cash assistance benefits under the Temporary Assistance to Needy
Families (TANF) (or welfare) program. Meanwhile, the Trump administration is
currently floating the idea of allowing states to impose lifetime limits on Medicaid
coverage.
Work requirements and lifetime caps are brand new to Medicaid, but they are not
new to low-income Americans. In 1996, Congress passed, and President Clinton
signed, welfare reform, known as the TANF program, which changed welfare
funding from an open-ended federal entitlement to a block grant system. TANF
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requires that program recipients work within two years of receiving benefits, and it
limits lifetime receipt of benefits at five years, although states can – and many do –
choose shorter time limits. TANF also permits states to cap benefits at a certain
family size (known as family caps), to drug test beneficiaries, and to adopt other
methods of attempted behavioral control, such as denying benefits to mothers who
do not identify the paternity of their children and cutting benefits to families with
truant children.
Upon signing TANF into law, President Clinton announced, “After I sign my
name to this bill, welfare will no longer be a political issue. The two parties cannot
attack each other over it. Politicians cannot attack poor people over it. There are no
encrusted habits, systems, and failures that can be laid at the foot of someone else.”
Clinton’s prediction fell flat, as low-income people continue to be attacked as lazy
“takers” and “welfare queens,” even though the economy fails to provide a stepping-
stone out of poverty for many workers. After 22 years of experience with TANF, the
evidence establishes that it fails to meet the needs of poor families. Indeed, the
withering of TANF as a safety-net program has increased extreme poverty (or
earnings of less than $2 a day), even as the country has climbed out of recession.1
Nevertheless, Republicans at the federal and state levels are methodically expanding
behavior control mechanisms into other public benefits programs, a phenomenon
I call “welfare creep.” This threatens to worsen poverty overall, but its impacts will
likely be harsher in red states. We can expect that poor residents living in red states
will face additional layers of disadvantage in coming years, and that behavior
modification laws will help propel this divergence. This chapter traces the extent
of welfare creep, identifies its causes, and examines its impacts.
welfare creep
In 1992, Lucie A. Williams wrote about emerging behavior modification proposals,
such as Learnfare (conditioning welfare eligibility on regular school attendance) and
family caps (denying additional benefits to families that have children while on
assistance), that the Bush-era federal government permitted states to adopt under a
welfare waiver program. As she wrote, “The idea behind all of these projects is the
same: only those women and children who conform to middle class majoritarian
values deserve government subsistence benefits.”2 Congress later codified these
behavior modification options in TANF, giving states the decision whether to
implement them. Today, welfare creep is resulting in “patchwork federalism,” in
which poor people receive vastly different levels of support depending solely on
1 H. Luke Shaefer & Kathryn Edin, Welfare Reform and the Families It Left Behind, Pathways,
Winter 2018, https://inequality.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/Pathways_Winter2018_Families-
Left-Behind.pdf.
2 Lucie A. Williams, The Ideology of Division: Behavior Modification Welfare Reform Proposals,
102 Yale L. J. 719, 720–21 (1992).
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where they live. This part examines the expanding scope of three behavior control
mechanisms: work requirements, family caps, and drug tests.
Work Requirements
Work requirements do not work. They neither increase work rates nor reduce
poverty for three main reasons: (1) large swaths of the poor are children, the elderly,
or disabled, and are not expected to work; (2) many people who want to work either
cannot find work or face significant personal barriers to work; and (3) many workers
do not earn enough to lift themselves out of poverty. Nevertheless, Republicans are
expanding work requirements throughout the safety net.
TANF: TANF imposes work obligations on both recipients and the states, and failure
to comply results in sanctions (for individuals) orfiscal penalties (for states). The rules are
complex. In brief, and with some exceptions, states must engage half of all single-parent
TANF families in work activities for at least 30 hours a week, with higher requirements
for two-parent families.3 A family faces sanctions if a parent fails to meet the work
requirements; sanctions can include termination of benefits for the entire family.
TANF supporters tout its success by pointing a 75 percent drop in the welfare rolls
since 1996. To be sure, in the immediate aftermath of TANF’s enactment, work
rates among TANF recipients rose due to the new work requirements and a strong
economy, as well as expansions of the Earned Income Tax Credit and child care
funding. However, work rates subsequently fell during the recession as welfare
leavers struggled to find and keep jobs.4 Indeed, studies have shown that mandatory
work requirements do not lead to higher work participation rates or stable employ-
ment over time.5 Moreover, states removed many families from TANF through
stringent eligibility requirements, sanctions, and diversionary tactics.6 States also
used the bulk of their TANF funds for purposes other than cash assistance, such as
child care and job training programs, and even to fill state budgetary gaps.7 All these
reasons contributed to the precipitous drop in the number of TANF recipients.
3 For an overview of work requirements, see Heather Hahn et al., Urban Institute, Work
Requirements in Social Safety Net Programs, Dec. 2017, at 4–6, www.urban.org/sites/default/
files/publication/95566/work-requirements-in-social-safety-net-programs.pdf
4 Id. at 5; see also Gene Falk et al., Congressional Research Service, Work Requirements, Time
Limits, and Work Incentives in TANF, SNAP, and Housing Assistance, Feb. 12, 2014, https://
greenbook-waysandmeans.house.gov/sites/greenbook.waysandmeans.house.gov/files/
R43400_gb.pdf.
5 MaryBeth Musumeci and Julia Zur, Kaiser Family Foundation, Medicaid Enrollees and Work
Requirements: Lessons from the TANF Experience, Aug. 18, 2017, www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-
brief/medicaid-enrollees-and-work-requirements-lessons-from-the-tanf-experience/.
6 Falk et al., supra note 4, at 19–20.
7 Liz Schott, Ladonna Pavetti, and Ife Floyd, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities,How States
Use Federal and State Funds under the TANF Block Grant, Oct. 15, 2015, www.cbpp.org/
research/family-income-support/how-states-use-federal-and-state-funds-under-the-tanf-block-
grant.
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Despite TANF’s underlying premise, work is not necessarily a pathway out of
poverty because low-wage workers earn very little money (the federal minimum wage
has been $7.25 since 2009) and often have unpredictable hours, while also bearing the
costs of working, such as child care, transportation, and uniforms. Meanwhile, some
people have severe barriers to work, such as limited education, criminal histories,
domestic violence, mental and physical disabilities, or addiction issues.8 Imposing
work requirements on these people pushes them deeper in poverty and homelessness.
Housing: The federal government subsidizes housing for low-income people
through a variety of programs, including public housing and housing choice
vouchers, which pay a portion of rent in the private housing market. Yet only
25 percent of eligible families receive housing assistance due to limited funding.9
Currently, the law governing subsidized housing programs does not contain work
requirements, although most residents of public housing must meet an eight-hour
monthly community service or self-sufficiency requirement.
Since 1999, HUD has granted permission to nine public housing authorities
(PHAs) and seven housing choice voucher programs to impose work requirements,
with the goal of moving residents to self-sufficiency.10 While the programs vary in
terms of the definition of work, hour requirements, and enforcement, residents can
face eviction for failure to comply. Trump’s 2019 budget included work require-
ments for all public housing residents.11 Under his budget, which is being codified
in proposed legislation, housing agencies and owners of property that accept subsid-
ized funding could evict or terminate subsidies for households with able-bodied,
working-age adults who do not work or participate in training or education pro-
grams. Notably, Trump’s budget does not include money for services to assist people
in obtaining or maintaining work, such as job training, child care, or transportation.
As with TANF, work requirements in housing have not been shown to have a
meaningful impact on either work or poverty rates. To begin with, only 6 percent of
subsidized households contain working-age, nondisabled members who are
unemployed.12 More than half these households are headed by elderly or disabled
residents; these are populations that either cannot or should not be required to work.13
8 Musumeci & Zur, supra note 5.
9 Hahn et al., supra note 3, at 14 (describing work requirements in subsidized housing programs).
10 Diane K. Levy, Leiha Edmonds & Jasmine Simington, Urban Institute, Work Requirements in
Public Housing Authorities: Experiences to Date and Knowledge Gaps, Jan. 2018, www.urban
.org/sites/default/files/publication/95821/work-requirements-in-public-housing-authorities.pdf.
11 Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the U.S. Government, Efficient, Effective,
Accountable: An American Budget, Fiscal Year 2019, at 64, www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2018/02/budget-fy2019.pdf.
12 Alicia Mazzara & Barbara Sard, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Chart Book: Employ-
ment and Earnings for Households Receiving Federal Rental Assistance, Feb. 5, 2018, www
.cbpp.org/research/housing/chart-book-employment-and-earnings-for-households-receiving-federal-
rental.
13 Id.
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A study of work requirements within Charlotte, North Carolina’s PHA found
modest impacts on work rates and negligible impacts on income. By contrast,
numerous studies show that voluntary work programs that provide support and
services to job seekers and workers are more effective at improving work rates and
reducing poverty than mandatory requirements.14
Medicaid:Work requirements are expanding into Medicaid, which is the nation’s
health insurance program for the needy and disabled that covers 74 million
Americans. Under the Medicaid program, states can seek demonstration waivers
under Section 1115 of the Medicaid statute to experiment with new policies. The
Trump administration has advised states that it will approve waivers so that states can
require Medicaid recipients to work. By July 2018, the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services granted waivers to Kentucky, New Hampshire, Indiana, and
Arkansas and was considering seven other similar state requests.15 A federal judge
halted implementation of the Kentucky waiver and sent it back to the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) for further review.
Experts have long debated the wisdom of work requirements in Medicaid: would
they provide a pathway out of poverty or hurt vulnerable people given that health is a
precondition to work?16 A survey of low-income adults in Kentucky found that partici-
pants “thought it was unrealistic to assume that requiring people to work as a condition
for receiving health insurance would enable them to rise out of poverty and smoothly
transition to employer-based coverage.”17 Among the focus group participants, one-
third said they were working but earning such low wages that they still qualified for
Medicaid. Other participants reported that they struggled to find work due to prior
convictions, lack of access to public transportation, or difficulty passing a credit check.
Still others were either mentally or physically disabled or homeless.
This survey mirrors nationwide research. Six in ten adults on Medicaid are
already working; of those who do not work, 35 percent are disabled, 28 percent are
family caregivers, 18 percent are in school, 8 percent are retired, and 8 percent
14 See James A. Riccio, MDRC, Sustained Earnings Gains for Residents in a Public Housing Jobs
Program, Jan. 2019, www.mdrc.org/publication/sustained-earnings-gains-residents-public-
housing-jobs-program; Abt Associates, Evaluation of the Compass Family Self-Sufficiency
(FSS) Programs Administered in Partnership with Public Housing Agencies in Lynn and
Cambridge, Massachusetts, Sept. 2017, http://abtassociates.com/AbtAssociates/files/3c/
3c791568–51a4–4934-9d99–0c9cef7fdbb9.pdf.
15 See Kaiser Family Foundation, Medicaid Waiver Tracker: Which States Have Approved and
Pending Section 115 Medicaid Waivers?, May 8, 2018, www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/which-
states-have-approved-and-pending-section-1115-medicaid-waivers/.
16 Jessica Greene, What Medicaid Recipients and Other Low-Income Adults Think about Medic-
aid Work Requirements, Health Affairs, Aug. 30, 2017, www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/
hblog20170830.061699/full/.
17 Id.
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cannot find jobs.18 Moreover, a Medicaid work requirement does little to shift
people toward employer-based health coverage because the jobs that low-income
people obtain, such as in agriculture or food service, typically do not offer health
benefits.
SNAP: States are also enforcing work requirements for Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Benefits (SNAP), commonly known as food stamps. Currently, about
40 million people receive SNAP, and the average income of SNAP households is
less than $10,000 per year. The average benefit is $126 per person per month
(or $1.40 per person per meal); amounts hinge on family size and income.19
Work requirements are not new to SNAP; Congress authorized them in the
1996 welfare reform law that also created TANF. 20 SNAP requires that able-
bodied adults between the ages of 18 and 49 without dependents (known as
ABAWD) work 80 hours per month unless they fall within an exception, other-
wise they cannot receive benefits for more than three months within three
years.21 States can get waivers from this SNAP time limit if their unemployment
rate hits 10 percent. In 2009, during the economic recession, the Obama admin-
istration suspended SNAP work requirements nationwide. As the economy
improves, however, states are reimposing time limits and work requirements with
federal permission.
Republicans are proposing to tighten SNAP’s work requirements and time limits
further. In February 2018, the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) began
soliciting public comment on a proposal to eliminate the remaining time limit
waivers, which still exist in five states and parts of 28 other states.22 President Trump’s
2019 budget proposal goes even further. It limits waivers to counties where
unemployment is at least 10 percent for more than a year, imposes work require-
ments on adults between the ages of 50 and 62, and limits work exemptions.23
18 Rachel Garfield, Robin Rudowitz & Anthony Damico, Kaiser Family Foundation, Under-
standing the Intersection of Medicaid and Work, Dec. 7, 2017, www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/
understanding-the-intersection-of-medicaid-and-work/.
19 Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, A Quick Guide to SNAP Eligibility and Benefits,
Feb. 7, 2018, www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/a-quick-guide-to-snap-eligibility-and-
benefits.
20 See Hahn et al., supra note 3.
21 USDA, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program: Able-Bodied Adults without Dependents,
www.fns.usda.gov/snap/able-bodied-adults-without-dependents-abawds.
22 Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program: Requirements and Services for Able-Bodied
Adults without Dependents: Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 83 Fed. Reg. 8013
(Feb. 23, 2018), www.federalregister.gov/documents/2018/02/23/2018-03752/supplemental-nutrition-
assistance-program-requirements-and-services-for-able-bodied-adults-without.
23 Caitlin Dewey, The Trump Administration Takes Its First Big Step toward Stricter Work
Requirements for Food Stamps, Wash. Post (Feb. 22, 2018), www.washingtonpost.com/news/
wonk/wp/2018/02/22/the-trump-administration-takes-its-first-big-step-toward-stricter-work-
requirements-for-food-stamps/.
The Difference in Being Poor in Red States versus Blue States 73
Overall, the budget aims to cut SNAP funding by $213.5 billion over 10 years. In
support of the budget, Agriculture Secretary Sonny Perdue said, “Too many states
have asked to waive work requirements, abdicating their responsibility to move
participants to self-sufficiency.”24
However, his rhetoric does not match the reality. To begin with, SNAP benefits
decrease incrementally with income, so there is no disincentive to work. Moreover,
according to the USDA, 43 percent of SNAP participants live in a household with
earnings.25 At the same time, 68 percent of recipients are children, elderly, disabled,
or caretakers.26 Unemployed ABAWDs are only about 6.8 percent of SNAP recipi-
ents, and this population includes people with serious barriers to work, such as
people with criminal convictions, individuals suffering undiagnosed mental illness,
veterans, and teenagers aging out of foster care.
Under the leadership of former Republican Governor Scott Walker, Wisconsin
has been particularly aggressive in toughening work requirements for SNAP
recipients. In 2018, the Wisconsin legislature passed a bill raising the amount of
time an ABAWD has to spend job searching, and the state also added parents of
children between the ages of 6 and 19 to the list of people who must meet work
requirements (although this change will require a federally approved waiver).27
Since work requirements went into effect in Wisconsin in 2013, 25,000 of 700,000
SNAP recipients have found work; the state does not know what happened to the
86,000 people who lost their SNAP eligibility under these rules.28 In Michigan,
the State Senate passed a bill in April 2018 to require Medicaid recipients to work –
but the bill exempts rural, predominantly white districts with high unemployment
rates from the requirement. This has led to charges that the proposed legislation is
racially discriminatory.29 As two commentators opined, “If work requirements
were a good idea, conservative Michigan legislators wouldn’t need to exempt their
rural constituents.”30
24 Press Release, USDA, USDA Seeks Ideas to Help SNAP Participants Become Independent,
Feb. 22, 2018, www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2018/02/22/usda-seeks-ideas-help-snap-participants-
become-independent.
25 USDA, Characteristics of Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program Households: Fiscal Year
2015, Jan. 17, 2018, www.fns.usda.gov/snap/characteristics-supplemental-nutrition-assistance-
households-fiscal-year-2015.
26 See Hahn et al., supra note 3.
27 See Robert Samuels, Wisconsin Is the GOP Model for “Welfare Reform”: But as Work
Requirements Grow, So Does One Family’s Desperation, Wash. Post, Apr. 22, 2018, www
.washingtonpost.com/politics/you-ever-think-the-government-just-dont-want-to-help-as-requirements-
for-welfare-grow-so-does-one-familys-desperation/2018/04/22/351cb27a-2315-11e8-badd-7c9f29a55815_
story.html?utm_term=.a57ad38786a7.
28 Id.
29 Nicholas Bagley & Eli Savit, Michigan’s Discriminatory Work Requirements, N.Y Times, May
8, 2018, www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/opinion/michigan-medicaid-work-requirement.html.
30 Id.
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Family Caps
TANF permits states to impose family caps, or limits on the amount of benefits to
families who have another child while on welfare. The idea behind family caps is to
reduce the birth rate among unmarried, poor women, thereby assuming that poor
women are irresponsible. In truth, however, the average number of children for
welfare mothers is 1.8,31 which is lower than the national average of 2.1.
Nevertheless, at peak, 24 states had TANF family caps.32 Seven states have since
rescinded these policies, including California in 2016.33 These states experienced
what study after study confirms – family caps have no impact on birth rates.34 This is
because most welfare recipients are not aware of family cap policies, thus making it a
nonfactor in their decision making. Moreover, additional welfare payments are too
paltry to justify having a child. As one study concluded, “It appears that women do
not make decisions about the birth of their children based on the addition of $42 per
month in . . . benefits.”35 Not only are family caps unjustified, but, by cutting
support to families, the caps are also “harmful to children, cause lifelong damage
to their learning and development, and increase the ‘deep poverty rate’ of children
by 13 percent.”36
Nevertheless, the proposed Trump 2019 budget would extend family caps into the
SNAP program, capping benefits at six persons per household. This would impact
80,000 SNAP households; the cap wouldmax SNAP benefits at $925 per month. This
means, for example, that a family of nine would see their benefits decrease from $4.87
per day per person to $3.43 per day per person. This is “significantly lower than even
the most conservative amount the USDA says is needed to feed a family.”37 The cap
may intend to reduce birth rates, but it would instead reduce benefits for multi-
generational families who live together for financial and child care support.
31 Office of Family Assistance, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Svcs., Characteristics and
Financial Circumstances of TANF Recipients, Fiscal Year 2010, www.acf.hhs.gov/ofa/
resource/character/fy2010/fy2010-chap10-ys-final.
32 Berkeley Law Center on Reproductive Rights and Justice, Bringing Families Out of “Cap”tiv-
ity: The Path toward Abolishing Welfare Family Caps, Aug. 2016, www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2015/04/2016-Caps_FA2.pdf.
33 Id.
34 Diana Romero & Madina Agénor, US Fertility Prevention as Poverty Prevention: An Empirical
Question and Social Justice Issue, 19 Women’s Health Issues, 355 (Nov.–Dec. 2009), www
.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2775139/.
35 Patricia Donovan, Does the Family Cap Influence Birthrates? Two New Studies Say “No,”
1 The Guttmacher Report 10–11 (Feb. 1998), www.guttmacher.org/gpr/1998/02/does-family-cap-
influence-birthrates-two-new-studies-say-no.
36 Teresa Wiltz, The Pew Charitable Trusts, Welfare Caps: More Harm Than Good?, Stateline,
July 13, 2016, www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2016/07/13/welfare-
caps-more-harm-than-good
37 Caitlin Dewey, Trump’s Budget Would Cut Off Food for Poor People if They Have Too Many
Kids, Wash. Post, May 24, 2017, www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/05/23/trumps-
budget-would-penalize-poor-people-for-having-too-many-kids/?utm_term=.6fec558cb787.
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Drug Tests
TANF gives states the authority to require drug testing as a condition of welfare
receipt. For its supporters, welfare drug testing is a means to combat drug abuse and
reduce drug crimes, while also ensuring that government funds are not used to pay
for illegal substances. Today, 15 states mandate drug testing under TANF, and
17 other states are currently considering it.38 Federal courts have already struck
down drug testing laws in Michigan and Florida as unconstitutional under the
Fourth Amendment because they constituted suspicionless government searches.39
In response to this litigation, several states have retooled their drug testing laws to
require reasonable suspicion, which, depending on the state, can arise from appli-
cant job histories, criminal backgrounds, personal observations, or questionnaires.40
As with other behavior modification tools, drug testing in the TANF program has
proved costly and ineffective, thus raising doubts that it should be expanded into
other government programs. For example, under TANF in 2014, seven states spent
more than $1 million on drug testing, but in six of them fewer than 1 percent of
persons tested positive (as compared to estimates of 9.4 percent of the general
population).41 Drug testing is also arbitrary given the weak correlation between
poverty and drug addiction.42 Kaaryn Gustafson describes drug testing as a “degrad-
ation ceremony,” in which politicians “engage in the dramaturgy of poverty, produ-
cing stories, meanings, and symbols that then shape the lives of poor parents and
their children.”43
Nevertheless, drug testing is now creeping into other forms of government
assistance. Republicans in Congress have introduced bills to require drug tests for
SNAP, TANF, rental assistance, and unemployment insurance.44 In addition,
President Trump has signaled that his administration will approve program waivers
to permit drug testing in a variety of safety-net programs. Some states are also eager to
38 National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), Drug Testing for Welfare Recipients and
Public Assistance, Mar. 24, 2017, www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/drug-testing-and-
public-assistance.aspx.
39 Marchwinski v. Howard, 60 Fed. App’x 601 (6th Cir. 2003) (in this case, the en banc court was
evenly split, thus the district court decision was affirmed per 6th Circuit rules); Lebron v. Sec. of
the Fla. Dep’t of Children and Families, 772 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 2014).
40 See NCSL, supra note 37.
41 Bryce Covert & Josh Israel, What 7 States Discovered after Spending More Than $1 Million
Drug Testing Welfare Recipients, Think Progress, Feb. 26, 2015, https://thinkprogress.org/
what-7-states-discovered-after-spending-more-than-1-million-drug-testing-welfare-recipients-
c346e0b4305d/.
42 Jordan C. Budd, Pledge Your Body for Your Bread: Welfare, Drug Testing, and the Inferior
Fourth Amendment, 19 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 751, 776–77 (2011).
43 Kaaryn Gustafson, Degradation Ceremonies and the Criminalization of Low-Income Women, 3
U.C. Irvine L Rev. 297, 321 (2013).
44 See, e.g., H.R. 2179, Drug Testing for Welfare Recipients Act (2017) (introduced by Rep.
Rouzer R-NC).
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jump on this bandwagon. Consider the SNAP program. Currently, SNAP allows
drug testing only in two circumstances. First, there are five states that take advantage
of a federal statutory option and permit people convicted of drug felonies to remain
eligible for SNAP – but only if they submit to a drug test. Second, an individual
disqualified from TANF for failing or refusing to take a drug test can be simultan-
eously disqualified from SNAP.45
Several Republican politicians are pushing for more. In December 2017, Gov-
ernor Walker of Wisconsin ordered implementation of the state’s drug testing law for
SNAP benefits, despite the absence of a required waiver from the USDA,46 and he
also rallied 12 other governors to sign a letter asking the USDA to approve drug
testing waivers. His optimism that the waiver will eventually be granted appears
sound given that the USDA, which oversees the SNAP program, issued a press
release in December 2017 stating “how important it is for states to be given flexibility
to achieve the desired goal of self-sufficiency for people.” 47
With regard to Unemployment Insurance (UI), states have not historically con-
ducted drug tests on applicants because the Social Security Act, which governs the
federal-state UI program, only allows states to add qualifying requirements that relate
to the “fact or cause” of a worker’s unemployment.48 Nevertheless, as unemploy-
ment ballooned during the recession, some states wanted to conduct drug testing,
assuming that it would cut down their eligible UI population and, thus, costs.49 In
2012, Congress passed a compromise bill that allows states to test UI claimants under
two conditions: (1) when the worker loses their job due to illegal drug use; and (2)
when the worker applies for jobs in an occupation that regularly conducts drug
testing.50 Under the Obama administration, the Department of Labor (DOL) then
issued regulations defining the latter category of jobs to mean occupations involving
transportation, guns, or positions where testing is legally required. Three states
subsequently passed laws permitting drug testing pursuant to these regulations.51
45 Maggie McCarty et al., Congressional Research Service, Drug Testing and Crime-Related
Restrictions in TANF, SNAP, and Housing Assistance, Nov. 28, 2016, at 11, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/
misc/R42394.pdf.
46 See Vann R. Newkirk II, Wisconsin’s Welfare Overhaul Is Almost Complete, The Atlantic,
Dec. 12, 2017, www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/12/wisconsin-drug-testing-food-stamp-
program-walker/547997/.
47 Press Release, USDA, USDA Seeks Ideas to Help SNAP Participants Become Independent,
Feb. 22, 2018, www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2018/02/22/usda-seeks-ideas-help-snap-participants-
become-independent.
48 Rontel Batie & George Wentworth, Drug Testing Unemployment Insurance Applicants: An
Unconstitutional Solution in Search of a Problem, National Employment Law Project Policy
Brief, Feb. 2017, www.nelp.org/content/uploads/Drug-Testing-Unemployment-Insurance-
Applicants.pdf.
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However, congressional Republicans52 and several Republican governors53 were
unhappy with what they viewed as an unduly narrow interpretation by DOL, and
Congress thus repealed the Obama-era regulation pursuant to the Congressional
Review Act. Then, in January 2018, DOL announced that it would seek public
comment on a broader rule that allows drug testing in a wider array of occupations,
and the rulemaking is moving forward.54
The relationship between subsidized housing and drug testing is a bit more
complex. There are no federal policies permitting or prohibiting drug testing as a
condition of moving into public housing.55 Instead, federal housing law requires
that local PHAs deny admission to households that include tenants determined to be
engaging in illegal drug use or alcohol use that interferes with other residents’ ability
to enjoy the premises.56 In addition, PHAs may enforce a “One Strike” policy, under
which a household faces eviction if one of its members engages in drug-related
criminal activity – even if the leaseholder has no knowledge of or control over the
activity.57 Congress enacted this policy as part of the War on Drugs in the 1980s as a
way to reduce drug abuse and drug-related crime and to make subsidized housing
safer.58 Yet policies and enforcement vary widely by jurisdiction, and thus, “similar
households in different locations may encounter radically different rules when
attempting to access or retain housing assistance.”59
A few PHAs have proposed or adopted drug testing for their public housing
residents, such as the Norwalk Housing Authority in Connecticut. Similar proposals
by PHAs in Chicago and Flint were dropped after legal opposition.60 For their part,
private landlords can mandate drug testing for tenants who receive federally subsid-
ized vouchers, and some landlords have done so.61 As private actors, they do not face
52 Human Resources Subcommittee Staff, Chairman Kevin Brady, Ways and Means, CRA: UI
Drug Testing Overreach, https://waysandmeans.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/CRA-
UI-Drug-Testing-Background.pdf.
53 J. B. Wogan, What the Unemployment Drug-Testing Bill That Trump Just Signed Means for
States, Governing, Mar. 28, 2107, www.governing.com/topics/health-human-services/gov-
congress-drug-testing-unemployment-states-trump.html.
54 See Lydia Wheeler, Labor Department Eyes Drug Test Rule for Unemployment Pay, The Hill,
Jan. 3, 2018, http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/367154-labor-department-eyes-drug-test-rule-
for-unemployment-pay.
55 Marah A. Curtis, Sarah Garlington & Lisa S. Schottenfeld, Alcohol, Drug, and Criminal
History Restrictions in Public Housing, 15 Cityscape 37 (2013) (summarizing range of
approaches used nationwide), www.huduser.gov/portal/periodicals/cityscpe/vol15num3/ch2
.pdf.
56 See McCarty et al., supra note 45, at 19–20 (describing the complexities of crime-related
restrictions in housing assistance).
57 The Supreme Court upheld this One Strike policy in U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban
Development v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002).
58 Lahny R. Silva, Collateral Damage: A Public Housing Consequence of the “War on Drugs,” 5
U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 783, 789–92 (2015), www.law.uci.edu/lawreview/vol5/no4/Silva.pdf.
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the same constitutional constraints as government entities. Meanwhile, congres-
sional Republicans have introduced a variety of bills to mandate drug testing in
housing programs nationwide.62 At the state level, Wisconsin will soon begin drug
screening for its public housing residents;63 this will likely spur other states to follow
given Wisconsin’s role as a leader in public benefits reform.
Moreover, Wisconsin has also sought a waiver from HHS to drug test Medicaid
recipients and to mandate treatment for anyone with positive test results.64 If
granted, it would be the first state with mandatory drug screening for Medicaid
recipients. And, whither goes Wisconsin, so do other – mostly Republican – states.
punishing the poor
We have much more data today about the effectiveness of behavior control mech-
anisms than we did when welfare reform went into effect in 1997. As discussed
previously, the evidence shows that they are counterproductive and harmful, par-
ticularly to children. These tools are also unnecessary because poor Americans share
the same values and work ethic as mainstream Americans.65 The question thus arises
why Republicans are pushing to expand these tools into additional social welfare
programs. To be sure, there are some economic similarities between the early 1990s
and today – both eras are marked by low unemployment and a booming economy,
making it easier to fault nonworkers than during recessionary times. The highly
polarized political climate is also similar. In 1992, as welfare reform proposals were
gathering steam, Lucie Williams explained that they were driven by “an ideology of
division,” which “sought to divert workers’ justified anger from the wealthy and to
focus it on welfare recipients.”66 This explanation holds particular resonance today.
The three main figures behind welfare creep are all white, male, Republican
politicians. First, former Speaker of the House Paul Ryan, a Republican from
Wisconsin, burnished a reputation throughout his career as a policy wonk with
poverty expertise. (He joined Congress in 1999; ran for Vice President in 2012; and
served as Speaker from 2015 to 2018, before retiring from Congress). He regularly
hyped the supposed success of welfare reform and advocated for block grants across
the safety net. He cautioned that the safety net was becoming a “hammock that lulls
able-bodied people to lives of dependency and complacency, that drains them of
62 See e.g., H.R. 2179, Drug Testing for Welfare Recipients Act (2017) (Rep. Rouzer R-NC).
63 Laurel White, Assembly Approves Walker Welfare Package, Wis. Public Radio, Feb. 15, 2018,
www.wpr.org/assembly-takes-walker-welfare-package.
64 Paige Winfield Cunningham, Want Medicaid Coverage? A Drug Test Should Come First,
Wisconsin Governor Says, Wash. Post, Apr. 2, 2017, www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/
want-medicaid-coverage-a-drug-test-should-come-first-wisconsin-governor-says/2017/04/02/
190068f0-160c-11e7-ada0-1489b735b3a3_story.html?utm_term=.3cb38513144b.
65 William Julius Wilson, When Work Disappears 181 (1997).
66 Williams, supra note 2, at 741–42.
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their will and their incentive to make the most of their lives.”67 Although he later
walked back these comments, he issued lengthy antipoverty plans to great fanfare in
2014 and 2016 that identified harms of poverty, but centered on cutting expenditures
while expanding work requirements, public-private partnerships, and state flexibil-
ity.68 The emphasis on federalism is a key component of welfare creep.
Second, former Governor Scott Walker of Wisconsin, elected in 2010 and
defeated in 2018, focused early in his tenure on (successfully) weakening organized
labor in his state and then turned his attention to behavior modification proposals.
In early 2018, he steered the Republican-controlled Wisconsin legislature to pass a
slew of public assistance reform bills that, among other things, expand work require-
ments for food stamps; require Medicaid recipients to maintain health savings
accounts; cut Medicaid benefits for parents behind in child support payments;
and require drug testing and employment for people in subsidized housing.69 These
bills passed with nary a Democratic vote. Under his leadership, Wisconsin was also
seeking a federal waiver to adopt work requirements within Medicaid. Conservative
activists are touting Wisconsin’s approach as a blueprint for the Republican Party,
and a conservative advocacy group, the Foundation for Government Accountability,
has staff in 14 states pushing for similar reforms.70 Notably, Walker was self-
consciously following in the footsteps of former Wisconsin Governor Tommy
Thompson who, in the mid-1990s, implemented many of the welfare reform ideas
that Congress later expanded nationally in TANF.71 The state-level push for welfare
creep will exacerbate red and blue state differences.
Third, President Trump is actively peddling behavior modification proposals.
Experts attribute the ascendance of President Trump to his appeal to white,
working-class voters who have faced decades of wage stagnation and job losses due
to globalization and technological displacement.72 Trump was able to channel their
discontent and funnel it toward minority groups, immigrants, and the poor, who he
67 Greg Sargent, Scott Walker and the Hammock Theory of Poverty, Wash. Post, Feb. 3, 2015,
www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2015/02/03/scott-walker-and-the-hammock-
theory-of-poverty/?utm_term=.ddf26ee6c382.
68 Chairman Paul Ryan, House Budget Committee Majority Staff, Expanding Opportunity in
America (2014), http://budget.house.gov/uploadedfiles/expanding_opportunity_in_america.pdf;
Paul Ryan, A Better Way (2016), https://abetterway.speaker.gov/.
69 Scott Bauer, Walker Signs 9 Bills Limiting Wisconsin Welfare into Law, U.S. News & World
Rep., Apr. 10, 2018, www.usnews.com/news/best-states/wisconsin/articles/2018-04-10/walker-to-
sign-9-welfare-overhaul-bills-into-law.
70 Reid Wilson, Wisconsin Welfare Reform Could Be Model for GOP, The Hill, Feb. 21, 2018,
http://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/374781-wisconsin-welfare-reform-could-be-model-for-
gop; Jen Fifield, Where the Work-for-Welfare Movement Is Heading, The Pew Charitable
Trusts, Stateline, Jan. 25, 2018, www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/
2018/01/25/where-the-work-for-welfare-movement-is-heading.
71 See Williams, supra note 2, at 726.
72 See Andrew Gelman & Julia Azar, 19 Things We Learned from the 2016 Election, 9–10
(Sep. 19, 2017), www.stat.columbia.edu/~gelman/research/published/what_learned_in_2016_5
.pdf; Brian F. Schaffner, Matthew MacWilliams & Tatishe Nteta, Understanding White
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painted as undeserving interlopers. In turn, these working-class individuals see
themselves as “victimized by the poor.”73 Katherine Cramer calls this strategy a
“politics of resentment,” in which “[p]eople understand their circumstances as the
fault of guilty and less deserving social groups, not as the product of broad social,
economic, and political forces.”74
In December 2017, after Trump signed a massive tax cut package whose benefits
flow to the wealthiest Americans and corporations, Trump and his Republican
counterparts in the House and Senate immediately began proposing cuts to public
benefits programs, along with behavior modification requirements. In his 2018 State
of the Union address, Trump threatened to cut off public assistance to recipients
unwilling to do a “hard day’s work.”75 He followed up this rhetoric in April 2018,
signing an executive order directing federal agencies to strengthen and introduce
new work requirements for recipients of Medicaid, food stamps, housing benefits,
and TANF.76 As a result, federal agencies are expected give states much more
leeway in adopting work requirements and other behavior control mechanisms
and, in turn, this will likely fuel a red and blue state policy divergence.
These Republican attacks on the poor weaken societal responsibility for aiding the
needy and divert the nation’s attention from the fortunes the wealthy are amassing.
Currently, the top 1 percent of the wealthy hold one-third of the nation’s assets,
while the top 1 percent of earners take home one-fifth of the nation’s total income.
Although states vary in their degrees of economic inequality, inequality has risen in
each and every state since the mid-1970s.77 This widening economic inequality
shows no signs of slowing down. Moreover, higher levels of economic inequality at
the state level are associated with a corresponding safety-net retrenchment.78
In advocating for welfare creep, Republicans are seizing advantage of several
dynamics within the American polity. Since the founding of America, the poor
have been categorized as either deserving – meaning they cannot be blamed for the
poverty, such as children, widows, and the disabled, or undeserving – meaning they
should be self-sufficient, such as able-bodied adults. The modern welfare state,
Polarization in the 2016 Vote for President: The Sobering Role of Racism and Sexism, 133 Pol. Sci.
Quart. 9 (2018).
73 Gustafson, supra note 43, at 354–55.
74 Katherine J. Cramer, The Politics of Resentment: Rural Consciousness in Wisconsin
and the Rise of Scott Walker 9 (2017).
75 President Donald J. Trump’s State of the Union Address, Jan. 30, 2018, www.whitehouse.gov/
briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trumps-state-union-address/.
76 Executive Order Reducing Poverty in America by Promoting Opportunity and Economic
Mobility, Apr. 10, 2018, www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-reducing-
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77 Lyle Scruggs & Thomas Hayes, The Influence of Inequality on Welfare Generosity: Evidence
from the US States, 45 Pol. & Soc. 35, 38–39 (2017).
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created during the New Deal, reinforced this dichotomy.79 Social insurance pro-
grams designed for white working men, such as social security and unemployment
insurance, have carried no stigma, provided generous benefits pursuant to objective
criteria, and been federally administered. By contrast, cash assistance programs for
the undeserving, such as single mothers, became stingy, stigmatized, and state
administered. The relentless blame targeted at the “undeserving” makes them easy
political targets. Meanwhile, it ignores structural determinants of poverty such as
globalization, the weakening of unions, and economic shifts from a manufacturing
to service economy, as well as the lack of living wage, affordable housing, or child
care for American workers.
The stigma around poverty is the flipside of the American conception of our
nation as a meritocracy, where the most talented and hard-working rise to the top. In
this view, failure to thrive in a capitalist economy is equated with moral failings.80
However, Americans are not as upwardly mobile as we like to think.81 In fact, we are
less mobile than other developed countries.82 Forty percent of children born in the
bottom quintile of the income distribution will stay there. The same “stickiness” is
present at the top quintile. In short, one’s economic standing in life is largely
determined by the “birth lottery,” that is, who your parents are.83 Indeed, interge-
nerational wealth transfers, or inheritance, is a major determinant of economic
stability.84 While individual merit certainly plays a role in one’s life outcomes, it is
blunted by the effects of discrimination and growing up poor.85 Meanwhile, rich
people get ample government benefits, such as tax deductions for home mortgages
and employer-provided health care worth thousands of dollars, but these are viewed
as earned, rather than as government charity. As Wendy Bach explains, these
programs are designed to incentivize behavior, but their inclusion in the tax code
submerges their nature as social support.86
Race underlies these political dynamics. Martin Gilens concludes that Americans
“hate” welfare because they associate it with African Americans, who they stereotype
as lazy.87 Although African Americans are disproportionately poor, the majority of
public assistance recipients are white. Still, the media relentlessly portrays poor
people as black in its stories and images, and this has a large impact on public
79 See Michele Gilman, The Return of the Welfare Queen, 22 J. of Gender, Soc. Pol’y & the
L., 247, 257–59 (2014).
80 Gustafson, supra note 43, at 343.
81 Stephen J. McNamee & Robert K. Miller Jr., The Meritocracy Myth 61 (2d ed. 2009).
82 Raj Chetty et al., Economic Mobility, in Pathways: State of the States 2015 55 (2015).
83 McNamee & Miller, supra note 79, at 60. See also David B. Grusky, Marybeth J. Mattingly &
Charles Varner, Executive Summary, Pathways, State of the States: The Poverty and
Inequality Report 2015 6 (2015) (discussing state variations in social mobility).
84 McNamee & Miller, supra note 81, at 61.
85 Id. at 221.
86 Wendy Bach, Poor Support/Rich Support: (Re)Viewing the American Social Welfare State, Fla.
Tax Rev.13–14 (2017).
87 Martin Gilens, Why Americans Hate Welfare (1999).
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opinion.88 The very word welfare evokes an emotional response that “exploit[s]
racial animus” – and that is the very point.89 Racial animus toward the poor is
crystallized in the trope of the welfare queen, who is portrayed as a lazy, black
mother of too many children who refuses to work while living off government
largesse. President Reagan introduced this stock character, and she remains a part
of political theater. The truth is that most TANF recipients are not African Ameri-
can; they stay in the program for short-term spells; they marry at the same rates of
other women; and they have long worked to meet basic expenses.90 “The overriding
myth continues to be that welfare persists because of the characteristics of the
families, not because of larger, structural conditions of society,” such as discrimin-
ation, wage stagnation, and lack of work-related benefits.91 Despite the rhetoric, the
political salience of the welfare queen far outstrips her budgetary impact – TANF is
a meager 0.47 percent of annual federal expenditures.
In 1996, President Clinton signed welfare reform to position himself as a centrist;
he and other Democrats also said that they hoped linking welfare with work would
ultimately increase public support for safety-net programs.92 Yet this never
happened. As Joe Soss and Sanford Schram explain, “[W]elfare reform did not alter
the way Americans distinguish the deserving from the undeserving or think about
policies for the disadvantaged” because welfare does not touch the lives of most
Americans, thus leaving “elite rhetoric, media frames, and widely held cultural
beliefs” firmly in place.93 Today’s Democrats appear to have recognized the folly
of championing the poor by making their lives harsher. Thus, behavior modification
proposals no longer garner significant bipartisan support. Instead, Republicans are
making welfare creep a central part of their domestic policy prescriptions. In turn,
this is driving a red and blue state divide for poor Americans.
patchwork federalism for the poor
The Constitution allocates power between the federal and state levels of govern-
ment, making the core question of federalism about where to set the boundaries.
Supporters of increased federalism – that is, greater power to the states – argue that it
moves decision making closer to the people, pushes states to serve as laboratories of
innovation, and increases efficiencies resulting from more localized service
88 Id. at 134–35.
89 Kenneth J. Neubeck & Noel A. Cazenave: Welfare Racism: Playing the Race Card
Against America’s Poor 3 (2001).
90 Gilman, supra note 79, at 263–64.
91 Joel F. Handler & Yeheskel Hasenfeld, Blame Welfare, Ignore Poverty and Inequality
158 (2009).
92 See Jason DeParle, American Dream: Three Women, Ten Kids, and a Nation’s Drive to
End Welfare 138–54 (2005).
93 Joe Soss & Sanford F. Schram, Welfare Reform as a Failed Political Strategy: Evidence and
Explanations for the Stability of Public Opinion, 24 Focus 17, 21 (2006).
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provision.94 Federalism rhetoric was potent and effective during the debates that
lead to enactment of TANF.95While federalism is neither inherently progressive nor
conservative,96 devolution to states on issues of redistribution is generally bad for
poor people.97 As compared to the federal government, states tend to adopt more
punitive redistribution policies and are less responsive to the needs of the poor. In
addition, federalism makes it harder for antipoverty advocates to lobby because they
must advocate in 50, rather than one, jurisdiction.98 Devolution of social welfare
policy also drives massive disparities between states that make one’s ability to weather
or even overcome poverty partly dependent on the state where they live.99
Today, public assistance in the United States is a shared federal and state
undertaking. By contrast, in early American history, states and localities carried all
the burdens of poor relief. The federal government began to play a role after the
Civil War, by establishing pensions for veterans and their widows. Still, the federal
role remained small until the Great Depression of the 1930s, when states were
overwhelmed by massive need. The New Deal, spearheaded by President Roosevelt,
made the federal government central to poor relief through the implementation of
social security, unemployment insurance, aid to families with children, jobs pro-
grams, and other social welfare measures. The New Deal carried out these programs
through a system of cooperative federalism, in which the federal government funded
the bulk of public assistance programs and set program parameters, while states
administered funds to beneficiaries and sometimes contributed a share to program
expenditures. Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society programs, such as Medicaid, con-
tinued this model.
By contrast, TANF represented a shift to New Federalism, in which the federal
government provides a set level of funding in the form of a block grant and gives the
states wider discretion to set eligibility and enforcement standards. Yet as Andrew
Hammond has explained, the TANF block grants not only resulted in massive
disparities among states but also in an overall reduction in spending on poverty
alleviation and a concurrent inability of the federal government to respond to
economic and natural emergencies.100 For this reason, he cautions progressive
federalists – those who see states as a bulwark against the current conservative,
94 See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (setting forth federalism justifications).
95 See Sheryll D. Cashin, Federalism, Welfare Reform and the Minority Poor: Accounting for the
Tyranny of State Majorities, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 552, 553 (1999).
96 See Heather K. Gerken, Federalism and Nationalism: Time for a Détente?, 59 St. Louis L. 997
(2015).
97 David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism and the Failure of
Antipoverty Law, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 541 (2008).
98 See Stephen D. Sugarman,Welfare Reform and the Cooperative Federalism of America’s Public
Income Transfer Programs, 14 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 123, 136 (1996).
99 Sarah K. Bruch, Marcia K. Meyers & Janet C. Gornick, The Consequences of Decentralization:
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Trumpian federal regime – against advocating for federalism when it comes to
redistributive programs. Power to the states is usually disempowering for the poor.
Hammond’s warning with regard to block grant funding holds true in connection
with regard to welfare creep. Welfare creep is occurring primarily through federally
granted waivers, which are permitted under various statutes. These statutes give
federal agencies the selective authority to allow states to deviate from statutory
requirements under certain circumstances. In short, they involve “the delegation
of the power to unmake Congress’s law.”101 Waivers are an increasingly popular
governance tool because, in theory, they give states flexibility while ensuring federal
oversight and adherence to core statutory purposes.102 In addition, in an era of
extreme partisanship, they provide a way around statutory gridlock because they
shift some specific policy-making decisions down the line and off the front pages.103
While waivers may have regulatory merits, Edward Stiglitz argues that in safety-net
programs, waivers inevitably lead to state retrenchment.104This is because states, unlike
the federal government, must balance their budgets. They cannot issue money, and
they are restricted in their spending and revenue-raising ability.105 As a result, “[T]hey
face the strongest budget pressure to control spending and decrease services at precisely
the time that safety nets have the most value in blunting poverty and inequality.”106
States thus tend to seekwaivers that allow them to reduce costs and services –waivers for
Medicaid work requirements are a prime example of this phenomenon.
At the same time, as Thad Cousser explains, when safety-net financial responsibility
shifts from the federal to state governments, such as through block grants, low-income
taxpayers pick up a greater share of the tab.107This is becausemoderate- and low-income
people pay a larger share of state tax burdens due to their regressive nature compared to
federal taxes, which are generallymore progressive.108Thus, devolutionmeans that low-
income people pay a larger share of their income in return for less services. This impact
is greater in red states, which are comparatively more regressive than blue states.109
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Meanwhile, waivers in safety-net programs have failed to provide the innovations
promised by federalism. For instance, more than one-third of all federal Medicaid
spending is through waiver programs. Yet as the General Accountability Office
reported in 2018, state Medicaid waiver programs have not been rigorously evalu-
ated, making it difficult to draw meaningful lessons from state policy variations.110
Likewise, in the context of TANF, states as “[l]aboratories have produced very little
innovation . . . it is hard to link observed variation in benefits or other program
components to anything other than race, political culture, ill-informed choice, and
the lingering influence of AFDC funding.”111
As each state goes it alone, safety-net waivers have resulted in a patchwork of
policies across the country. For instance, under the TANF program, “where a family
lives helps determine whether it receives cash assistance, the amount and types
of assistance, and the requirements to maintain eligibility.”112 Postrecession,
the national poverty rate has fallen by 3 percent, while the TANF caseload has
nevertheless plunged 28 percent – indicating that many people are not getting the
help they need to make ends meet.113 Indeed, TANF serves only 23 out of 100 poor
families, which is a sharp drop from 68 out of 100 when TANF was enacted.114 Yet
states vary widely in this TANF-to-poverty ratio; Louisiana’s TANF program reaches
4 out of 100 poor families, while California’s reaches 66 out of 100.115 There are
15 states in which TANF reaches 10 percent or lower of the poor population. Not
surprisingly then, rates of extreme poverty – or families living on less than $2 a day –
are highest where TANF is least accessible, particularly in Appalachia and the Deep
South.116
Poverty rates also vary by state. While the national poverty rate is around 12 percent,
that number masks huge differences among states. The poorest regions are the South
and West; while poverty rates are lowest in New England, the Mid-Atlantic, and the
UpperMidwest.117 Poverty rates only tell part of the story, however, because they do not
capture the scope or scale of relief efforts. The effectiveness of the overall safety net
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and Procedures (Jan. 2018), www.gao.gov/assets/690/689506.pdf. See also Frank Thompson
& Courtney Burke, Executive Federalism and Medicaid Demonstration Waivers: Implications
for Policy and Democratic Process, 32 J. of Health Pol. 971, 982 (2007):
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varies widely by state, as shown by the “poverty relief ratio,” which “reports the amount
of income support provided, relative to the amount required to provide for all low-
income households’ basic needs.”118Thismetric shows that some statesmeet only about
26 percent of need, while othersmeet asmuch as 40 percent of need. The states with the
highest relief ratios tend to be in the West and Northeast, while the lowest ratios are in
the South and some interior states.119 “It follows that, when one’s market income falls
short, much rides on whether one lives in a state with an effective safety net.”120 States
with weak safety nets tend also to score lower in other domains related to economic
security, such as labor markets, poverty, inequality, education, health, and economic
mobility. In other words, disadvantages tend to be concentrated in certain states.121
These layers of disadvantage also operate regionally, particularly in the South,making it
hard for individuals to escape their effects simply by moving across state lines.122
Race explains part of the state variation in the poverty relief ratio. Consider the
geographic differences in TANF policies across the country. Over the last two
decades, scholars have consistently found that TANF policies are more punitive
and less generous in states with higher proportions of minority populations.123 The
Urban Institute recently reaffirmed these findings after studying multiple TANF
policy choices in every state and concluding that states with harsher sanction
policies, higher asset limits, and shorter time limits are states where African Ameri-
can people are disproportionately concentrated.124 Not surprisingly then, “States
with TANF-to-poverty ratios in the bottom half nationally are home to the majority
(56 percent) of African American people but only 46 percent of non-Hispanic white
people.”125
By contrast, as Brown and Best explain, race is not correlatedwith variations in SNAP
policies (food assistance) or Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) policies
(heath care for low-income children). With regard to CHIP, state policy variations are
driven by economic need (states tend to be more generous where need is greater), as
well as by politics (Republican legislative control at the state level is associated with
higher-income eligibility levels). In comparison, SNAP policies are tied most closely
with political variables; states with Republican governors generally have much stricter
118 Karen Long Jusko & Katherine Weisshaar, Are We Providing Enough to Those Who Have Too
Little? Measuring Poverty Relief, Pol. Sci. Rsch. & Methods 1 (2017), https://people.stanford
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eligibility requirements. Notably, in 2018, Republicans dominate states with unified
control of government; Republicans hold twenty-six, while Democrats hold eight.126
Early indicators of welfare creep seem to be bringing these three dynamics –
economic, racial, and political – into play. First, an improving economy is making it
politically more palatable to blame the poor for their plight, even though wages
remain stubbornly stagnant. Second, Trump and his fellow Republicans are aggres-
sively terming all safety-net programs as “welfare,” in a ploy to reduce public support
for public assistance. By turning welfare into a dirty word, they are rhetorically
pushing all needy people into the “undeserving” category and extending racist tropes
about the needy. Whereas CHIP was long considered a bipartisan program to assist
innocent (i.e., deserving) children, Trump is now proposing $7 billion in budget
cuts to the program to reduce the deficit – which is ballooning due to the 2017 tax
cuts for the wealthy. This follows a four-month funding gap for CHIP in late
2017 after the program became a bargaining chip in a government shutdown over
the budget. This new politicized dynamic around CHIP suggests that even the most
bipartisan safety-net programs are no longer secure. Third and finally, welfare creep
is almost exclusively a Republican project.
The convergence of these economic, racial, and political factors will fallmost harshly
on red states, as early signs suggest. Of the 10 states that first applied for Medicaid work
waivers, seven are in the bottomhalf of states in terms of theTANF-to-poverty ratios, and
six of the ten have TANF-to-poverty ratios of less than 10 (meaning fewer than 10 out of
100 eligible families are receiving TANF). Five of the ten states are in the bottomhalf of
states when considering their poverty relief ratio. Four of the states are among the most
regressive in terms of tax policies (states in which the bottom 20 percent pay up to seven
times as much of their income in taxes as the wealthy). All 10 of these waiver-seeking
states are led by Republican governors, and eight of the states are entirely Republican
controlled in both the executive and legislative branches.
Being poor in America is difficult wherever you live – but there tends to be more
generous support in blue states. In addition, postrecession labor force participation
in blue states is outpacing red states, likely due to the variations in industrial
structure (manufacturing and retail are concentrated in red states, while blue states
have growth in technology and life sciences).127 At the same time, red states are
increasingly adopting behavior modification requirements as a condition of receiv-
ing public assistance. The red state/blue state divide is a real one for poor Americans.
It can mean the difference between being able to pay rent, put food on the table, or
obtain necessary medical care.
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